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ARTICLES
THE CRITICAL IMPORTANCE OF PROVING MARKET
IMPACT IN SHERMAN ACT ANTITRUST CASES: A
REVIEW OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S RECENT
ANTITRUST DECISIONS*
David S. Copeland'
INTRODUCTION:

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MARKET ANALYSIS TO

ANTITRUST

It cannot be denied that antitrust has recovered resoundingly from the doldrums of the 1980s, during which the principal academic debate was -whether the so-called "Chicago
School" had so completely persuaded the United States Supreme Court and federal appellate courts to correct the perceived mistakes of the past that there was hardly any meaningful antitrust law left.' Renewed antitrust enforcement by
federal and state governmental agencies in the 1990s, coupled
with a resurgence of civil litigation brought by private plaintiffs, has brought our society to the point where the previously
arcane jargon of antitrust is regularly bandied about on network and cable television news programs, and the Microsoft
01999 David S. Copeland. All Rights Reserved.
t Member of the New York Bar and of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays &
Handler, LLP. The author thanks his partners Michael Malina and Richard Steuer
for their insightful comments on a draft of this Article, as well as his associate
Mercer Givhan for his assistance in the Article's preparation.
1 See, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox, The Battle For The Soul Of Antitrust, 75 CAL. L.
REV. 917 (1987); Milton Handler, Is Antitrust's Centennial A Time For Obsequies
Or For Renewed Faith In Its National Policy?, 10 CARDOZO L. REv. 1933 (1989)
(arguing, inter alia, that "non-enforcement as a matter of deliberate policy is a
subversion of the rule of law"); Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago,
84 MICH. L. REV. 213 (1985). The basic texts of the Chicago School include: ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLiCY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978);

Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TFx L. REV. (1984); and Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925
(1979).
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case has become so famous that it has been the subject of a
cartoon parody in Mad magazine.2
Nonetheless, even if antitrust has made a loud and public
comeback, the criticism which led to its brief downturn has
had a lasting effect. No government official today would dream
of condemning a merger of two companies with less than a
10% joint share of an unconcentrated market, though it was
not so long ago that the Supreme Court did exactly that.3 To
make the same point in more precise terms, there is now a
broad recognition among practitioners and courts that in order
to prove civil liability under the most commonly litigated federal antitrust statutes, there must be proof of market impact,
that is, harm to competition via higher prices or the exclusion
of competitors.4
Thus, under the existing precedent of the Supreme Court
and, in particular, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, proof
of an actual adverse effect on competition in the relevant market is generally required in cases brought under § 1 of the
Sherman Act, which condemns contracts, combinations or conspiracies in unreasonable restraint of trade.' Likewise, in a
claim for actual or attempted monopolization under § 2 of the
Sherman Act, Supreme Court and Second Circuit precedents
require proof that the defendant has actual or imminent monopoly power (typically, though not exclusively, shown by dominance of the relevant market) and has engaged in actual
anticompetitive conduct.6

2 See Desmond Devlin, Settling the Microsoft Lawsuit on Judge Judy, No. 386
MAD MAGAZINE, Oct. 1999, at 21, 23 (wherein the court declares that "Sometimes
a monopoly IS a good thing!" albeit in the context of "court show[s] on TV").
' See United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
4 By "most commonly litigated federal antitrust statutes," I mean to include
§§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1997), as well as § 7 of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1997). I am intentionally excluding the RobinsonPatman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1997), under which price discrimination can be declared illegal if the statutory criteria are met, regardless of whether the challenged
conduct is truly anticompetitive.
' See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1997); see also Bogan v. Hodgkins, 166 F.3d 509 (2d Cir.
1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 526 (1999).
6 See, e.g., Tops Mkts., Inc. v. Quality Mkts., Inc., 142 F.3d 90, 97-98 (2d Cir.
1998). The requirements for a § 2 conspiracy to monopolize claim are somewhat
distinct. See International Distribution Ctrs. v. Walsh Trucking Co., 812 F.2d 786,
795 & n.8 (2d Cir. 1987) (emphasizing importance of a shared specific intent to
monopolize).
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In short, market analysis in general and the issue of market impact in particular has become increasingly important to
antitrust. It is within that context that this Article reviews the
recent antitrust jurisprudence of the Second Circuit.'

I. THE IMPORTANCE OF ESTABLISHING MARKET IMPACT IN
SHERMAN ACT § 1 CASES: THE SECOND CIRCUIT
MAINTAINS THE ANTITRUST STATUS Quo

A. The Basic Requirement of Adverse Effect on Competition
If one recent Second Circuit opinion had to be selected to
represent traditional antitrust principles in the context of a
claim brought under § 1 of the Sherman Act, it might well be
Judge Cardamone's opinion in Tops Markets, Inc. v. Quality
Markets, Inc.,' a case involving an alleged conspiracy between
a leading local supermarket owner and a local developer pursuant to which the developer agreed to breach its contract to sell
parcels of land to another supermarket owner who planned to
build competing stores? Starting with the basic elements of
the plaintiffs claim, the court in Tops Markets explained that:
To establish a § 1 violation, a plaintiff must produce evidence sufficient to show: (1) a combination or some form of concerted action
between at least two legally distinct economic entities; and (2) such
combination or conduct constituted an unreasonable restraint of
trade either per se or under the rule of reason."

Much of the ground ploughed in this Article was explored with greater erudition and thoroughness nearly 20 years ago by my mentor and partner Michael
Malina in The Antitrust Jurisprudence of the Second Circuit, 37 REC. A.B. CITY
N.Y. 436 (1982). New crops have grown since then, however, and therefore this
Article-which focuses on Second Circuit antitrust opinions within the past two
years where the decision was based to some material extent on market analysis-is
timely. It should be noted that this Article does not discuss several recent and
interesting Second Circuit antitrust cases dealing with issues unrelated to market
analysis. See, e.g., Omega Homes, Inc. v. Buffalo, 171 F.3d 755 (2d Cir. 1999)
(holding city of Buffalo immune from antitrust liability under state action doctrine
and private defendants immune under Noerr-Pennington doctrine), cert. denied, 120
S. Ct. 179 (1999). The Article also does not directly address the substantial and
continuing contribution to antitrust law of the district courts in the Second Circuit.
8 142 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 1998).
9 See id. at 96.
'0 Id. at 95-96.
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In other words, once some form of concerted conduct has been
established, a court must decide whether the conduct at issue
falls within the few types of agreements that are so inherently
anticompetitive that they have been condemned as per se illegal." If not, then the concerted conduct is evaluated under
the rule of reason, which provides that an agreement or other
concerted conduct is deemed to violate the antitrust laws if it
possesses anticompetitive effects that outweigh its
procompetitive benefits. 12 In Tops Markets, the court ex-

plained that "before a factfinder may consider the harms and
benefits of the challenged behavior," the plaintiff must as a
threshold matter prove that "'the challenged action had an
actual adverse effect on competition as a whole in the relevant
market; to prove it has
been harmed as an individual competi13
tor will not suffice."

Thus, the Second Circuit endorsed the fundamental principle that market impact must be proved in § 1 cases decided
under the rule of reason. The court explained that the requisite adverse effect may be shown in one of two ways. First, the
plaintiff may show an actual anticompetitive effect, such as re-

" Price-fixing and territorial allocation agreements between competitors are per
se illegal under virtually any circumstances, without regard to whether the parties
to the agreement collectively possess market power. See, e.g., Palmer v. BRG of
Georgia, Inc., 498 U.S. 46 (1990) (per curiam) (reiterating per se rule against
market allocation agreements in case involving bar review courses); United States
v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 396-401 (1927) (classic statement on price
fixing). Boycotts among competitors that are designed to affect prices are treated
as per se illegal. See FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411,
435-36 & n.19 (1990). In other contexts, however, courts have required a threshold
showing of market power before condemning a competitor boycott. See Northwest
Wholesale Stationers v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 295-96
(1985) (boycott to exclude plaintiff from membership in trade association). Similarly, tying arrangements, where a seller refuses to sell the tying product unless the
purchaser also buys the tied product, are per se illegal only if the seller has market power in the tying product. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde,
466 U.S. 2 (1984). Finally, in the area of agreement between suppliers and dealers, the only type of agreement that is per se illegal is a resale price maintenance
agreement establishing a minimum (as opposed to a maximum) resale price. Compare Business Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 720 (1988) (reaffirming that resale price maintenance is per se illegal), with State Oil Co. v.
Khan, 118 S. Ct. 275, 285 (1997) (holding that vertical maximum price fixing is
not a per se violation of the Sherman Act).
See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
13 Tops Mkts., 142 F.3d at 96 (quoting Capital Imaging Assocs. v. Mohawk
Valley Med. Assocs., Inc., 996 F.2d 537, 541 (2d Cir. 1993)).
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duced output in the relevant market.'4 Second, a plaintiff may
rely on proof of the defendant's market power (typically shown
by reference to market share) "as a proxy for adverse effect,"
but the plaintiff must also establish "some other ground for
believing that the challenged behavior could harm competition
in the market, such as the inherent anticompetitive nature
of the
defendant's
behavior or the structure of the
interbrand market." 5
Applying the foregoing legal standard, the Second Circuit
determined that the plaintiff had failed to establish that the
defendant supermarket's agreement with a local land developer, which had prevented the plaintiff supermarket from acquiring some desirable land, had the requisite adverse effect on
competition.' In fact, the plaintiff had presented no evidence
of actual adverse effect, such as higher prices in the relevant
market, decreased quality of service, or exclusion of other supermarkets. 7 With respect to the use of market power to
measure actual adverse effect, the court assumed, arguendo,
that the defendant's 72% market share implied the possession
of market power, but found no other evidence from which an
adverse competitive effect could be inferred. 8
Accordingly,
the court afred
the district court's grant of summary
judgment in the defendant's favor on the plaintiff's Sherman
Act § 1 claim.' 9
B. The Second Circuit'sRecent Application of Market Impact
Principlesin Sherman Act § 1 Cases Involving SupplierDealerAgreements
The underlying philosophical premise of the basic antitrust
rules governing agreements between suppliers and dealers is

2'See id. (citations omitted).
"

'6
17

Id. at 97.
See id. at 94-95.
See id. at 96.

15 See Tops Mkts., 142 F.3d at 97. Basically, the court found that while the
defendant's one-time purchase of land from the developer may have blocked the
plaintiff from acquiring a choice site, it did nothing to "foreclose other prospective
competitors from entering the market in desirable locations." Id. In fact, another
supermarket was able to build a 100,000 square foot store in the local market and
acquire a 26% market share within a year of doing so. See id.

" See id.
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that such "vertical" arrangements are often procompetitive
because they typically serve to enhance the supplier's ability to
engage in "interbrand" competition with other suppliers. 0 In
contrast, "horizontal" agreements between competitors are
typically perceived as adverse to robust interbrand competition; accordingly, the per se rule of illegality is most often
applied in antitrust cases involving horizontal agreements
21
between competitors (such as price-fixing agreements).
To be sure, a supplier-dealer agreement, such as an agreement restricting the geographic territory in which the dealer
may sell the supplier's goods, may also adversely affect
Nonetheless,
"intrabrand" competition between dealers. 22
United States antitrust law in its present incarnation recognizes a hierarchy in which intrabrand competition runs a distant second to interbrand competition on the assumption that
consumers are more likely to benefit, and will benefit more
directly, from the latter type of competition as opposed to the
former. In the recent words of the Second Circuit, "antitrust law shows more concern to protect inter- rather than
intrabrand competition."23
Given this context, it is not surprising that, as the law
now stands, virtually all supplier-dealer agreements are governed by the rule of reason.' The only settled exception relates to resale price maintenance ("RPM") agreements which,
under the Supreme Court's 90-year-old holding in Dr. Miles
Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, Co.,25 remain per se
illegal. But even the exception has an exception: if the RPM

2 See, e.g., Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 724

(1988) (recognizing that vertical non-price restraints have "real potential to stimulate interbrand competition").
21 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
22 See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51-52
(1977).
Bogan v. Hodgkins, 166 F.3d 509, 515 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing NYNEX Corp. v.
Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128 (1998)), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 526 (1999).
2 That is certainly true with respect to vertical non-price restraints such as an
exclusive territorial agreement between a supplier and a dealer. See Continental
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). Moreover, under the Supreme
Court's decision in Business Electronics Corp., a vertical agreement will be considered non-price "unless it includes some agreement on price or price levels." 485
U.S. at 735-36.
2 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
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agreement sets a ceiling rather than a floor, thereby creating a
"maximum" RPM agreement, the rule of reason applies.2 6
1. The Discon Saga: The Second Circuit's Brief Departure
from the Antitrust Mainstream
In Discon, Inc. v. NYNEX Corp.,27 the Second Circuit
challenged the presumption of legality in supplier-dealer arrangements in two ways. First, in Discon I, the court declared
that an agreement between a supplier and one of its dealers to
eliminate another dealer could "possibly" be governed by "the
per se rule applied to [horizontal] group boycotts... , if the
restraint of trade has "no purpose except stifling competition.' 28 Second, in Discon I-after the Supreme Court had
declared that the per se rule could have no application to the
situation where a supplier replaces one dealer with another
pursuant to an agreement between the supplier and the favored dealer 2 9 -the Second Circuit on remand held that the
plaintiff should still be given the opportunity to prove that the
alleged supplier-dealer agreement at issue was illegal under
the rule of reason, which will require a threshold showing of
injury to competition.3 0
The Discon case arose following the restructuring of the
telephone service industry in the late 1980s. Prior to 1984,
American Telegraph and Telephone ("AT&T") was the nation's
primary telephone service provider and, through its subsidiaries, also supplied a substantial portion of the nation's telephone equipment.3 ' A 1984 antitrust consent decree ended
AT&T's participation in the local telephone service business,
limiting AT&T to providing long distance service in competition with companies like MCI and Sprint." As a result of the

See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
Discon, Inc. v. NYNEX Corp., 93 F.3d 1055 (2d Cir. 1996) [hereinafter
Discon I], affd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded, NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc.,
119 S. Ct. 493 (1998), on remand, Discon, Inc. v. NYNEX Corp., 184 F.3d 111 (2d
Cir. 1999) [hereinafter Discon II].
28 Discon I, 93 F.3d at 1061 (citations omitted).
29 See Discon, 119 S. Ct. at 499-500.
30 Discon II, 184 F.3d at 114.
31 See Discon, 119 S.Ct. at 495.
28

22

See id.

(citing M. KELLOGG ET AL.,

§ 4.6, at 222 (1992)).

FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS

LAW
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consent decree, the local telephone companies, formerly owned
by AT&T, became independent companies." The consent
decree also required that these new independent local telephone companies help assure competitive long distance service
by granting long distance companies physical access to their
systems and local customers.3 4 To enable such physical access, some local telephone companies had to install new
"call switching" equipment, which often required removal
of old equipment.35
Discon, Inc. ("Discon"), a "removal services" provider, was
in the business of removing old call switching equipment.36
Discon provided removal services to New York Telephone Company ("NYTel"), a subsidiary of NYNEX Corporation engaged
in providing local telephone service throughout New York as
well as parts of Connecticut.3 7 NYNEX also owned Materiel
Enterprises Company ("MECo"), a purchasing entity that
bought removal services for NYTel.3"
Discon's complaint alleged that NYNEX, NYTel, MECo,
and several NYNEX-related individuals ("NYNEX Defendants")
engaged in a "scheme to defraud the rate paying public" pursuant to which NYNEX and MECo, in procuring removal services
for NYTel, discriminated against Discon in favor of its competitor, AT&T Technologies. 9 Specifically, Discon alleged that the
NYNEX Defendants favored AT&T Technologies because it
was willing to participate in a scheme whereby MECo paid
inflated prices for removal services, which were then passed on
(through NYTel) to consumers, after which the removal services provider would issue a secret rebate to MECo.4"

See Discon, 119 S. Ct. at 495.
, See United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 225, 227 (D.D.C. 1982), affd
sub nom., Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
" Discon, 119 S. Ct. at 496.
" See id.
' See id.

3 See id.
3' Discon 1, 93 F.3d 1055, 1058 (2d Cir. 1996).
,o The Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") conducted an independent
regulatory proceeding regarding the alleged actions that served as the basis for
Discon's complaint. See id. In that proceeding, the FCC determined that the
NYNEX Defendant's scheme for generating revenues violated the Communications
Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1988). See id. The FCC ordered NYTel to issue a
rebate to its rate-paying customers for overcharges that occurred between 1984
and 1988. See id. The FCC and NYTel ultimately entered into a consent decree,
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Discon's amended complaint alleged that the NYNEX
Defendants had violated §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act as well
as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
("RICO")."' In June 1995, the district court granted the
NYNEX Defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim and dismissed all of Discon's claims with prejudice.42
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's
dismissal of Discon's claims for vertical price-fixing under § 1
of the Sherman Act, for monopolization and price-fixing under
§ 2 of the Sherman Act, and its civil RICO claims.43 The court
found, however, that Discon's complaint alleged a "two-firm
group boycott" and therefore stated claims of an unlawful boycott under § 1 of the Sherman Act and a conspiracy to monopolize under § 2 of the Sherman Act.'
In reversing the lower court's dismissal of Discon's groupboycott claim, the Second Circuit focused on Discon's allegation
that MECo had switched its purchases from Discon to AT&T
Technologies as part of an attempt to defraud local telephone
service customers by deceiving regulators.45 The court found
that these allegations stated a cause of action under § 1 of the
Sherman Act, though under a "different legal theory" from the
one articulated by Discon.46 While conceding that ordinarily
"the decision to discriminate in favor of one supplier over
another will have a pro-competitive intent and effect,"47 the
court nonetheless found that, in this case, "no such pro-competitive rationale appears on the face of the complaint."48 To
the contrary, the court found that the complaint alleged that

pursuant to which, without admitting any wrongdoing or violations, NYTel agreed
to refund over $35 million for "unreasonable rates reflecting improper capital costs
and expense charges." Id. (quoting In re New York Tel. Co., 5 F.C.C.R. 5892
(1990)).
" See Discon I, 93 F.3d at 1057.
42 See id.
See id. at 1064.
See id.
" See id. at 1058.
46 See Discon I, 93 F.3d at 1060.
'7 Id. at 1061.
4 Id.
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MECo's decision to favor AT&T Technologies over Discon
for equipment removal services was, and was intended to
be, anti-competitive.49
The Second Circuit noted that other courts of appeals were
uncertain as to whether, or when, the per se group boycott rule
applies to a decision by a purchaser to favor one supplier over
another, pursuant to a so-called "two-firm group boycott." 0
The court decided that if the alleged restraint of trade "has no
purpose except stifling competition,'"' then Discon had stated
a cause of action under the rule of reason and possibly under
the per se group boycott rule articulated in Kior's, Inc. v.
Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.52
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether
the per se group boycott rule applied where, as alleged by
Discon, a single buyer favors one seller over another, albeit for
improper reasons." Interestingly, while NYNEX Corp. v.
Discon, Inc. was pending resolution in the Supreme Court, the
Second Circuit was again asked to decide whether the substitution of one dealer or supplier for another could serve as the
basis for an antitrust claim, absent a plausible claim of harm
to the overall competition in the relevant market. In Electronics Communications Corp. v. Toshiba American Consumer
Products, Inc.,"4 a different panel held that such an allegation

could not support an antitrust claim because it was not a violation of the antitrust laws for a manufacturer to terminate a
distributor and to appoint an exclusive distributor "without a
showing of an actual adverse effect on competition market-

49 Id.

" See id. Compare Corn-Tel Inc. v. DuKane Corp., 669 F.2d 404, 411-13, 412
n.13, 413 n.16 (6th Cir. 1982), and Cascade Cabinet Co. v. Western Cabinet &
Milwork Inc., 710 F.2d 1366, 1370-71 (9th Cir. 1983), with Construction Aggregate
Transp., Inc. v. Florida Rock Indus., Inc., 710 F.2d 752, 776-78 (11th Cir. 1983).
" Discon I, 93 F.3d at 1061.
52 359 U.S. 207 (1959) (quoting Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126,
131 (2d Cir. 1978) (en banc)). For essentially the same reasons, the court found
that Discon's complaint stated a valid claim of conspiracy to monopolize under § 2
of the Sherman Act. See Discon 1, 93 F.3d at 1062 ("We conclude that the complaint sufficiently alleges that the NYNEX Defendants conspired with AT&T Technologies and performed overt acts intending to assist AT&T Technologies in its
monopolization of the market for removal services.").
" See NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 523 U.S. 1019 (1998) (granting certiorari).
54 129 F.3d 240 (2d Cir. 1997).
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wide[.]" 5 5 In an effort to distinguish the allegations in Electronics Communications from the allegations in Discon, the
Electronics Communications court focused on the fraudulent
aspects of the defendants' alleged actions in Discon."
The need for the Second Circuit to distinguish Discon in
future cases is now over, because the Supreme Court reversed
the court of appeals' ruling insofar as it held that a vertical
"two-firm" boycott could be per se illegal. In a unanimous opinion, authored by Justice Breyer, the Court held that "precedent
limits the per se rule in the boycott context to cases involving
horizontal agreements among direct competitors.""7
The Supreme Court's opinion stressed that "[t]he freedom
to switch suppliers lies close to the heart of the competitive
process that the antitrust laws seek to encourage."5 8 Accordingly, in cases involving refusals to deal, the plaintiff "must
allege and prove harm, not just to a single competitor, but to
the competitive process, i.e., to the competitive process itself."5 9 The Court concluded that application of the per se
rule (dispensing with such proof) to the substitution of one
supplier for another "would discourage firms from changing
suppliers-even where the competitive process itself does not
suffer harm.""
The Supreme Court criticized the Second Circuit for devising the two-firm group boycott theory, a theory of its own that
neither party had argued, according to which an agreement

5' Id. at 244.

5 Thus, the Electronics Communications court stated:
True, we recently held [in Discon] that an agreement between a supplier
and its purchaser that disadvantaged the supplier's competition could

constitute a violation of the antitrust laws, even a per se violation ....
In Discon, however, the alleged agreement between the purchaser and
the supplier involved a fraudulent scheme to defraud the ratepaying

telephone customers whereby the telephone company's purchasing agent
bought services from the conspiring supplier at inflated prices, charged
these to customers, and then received a partial rebate from the supplier .... The Court distinguished the case from one involving a typical
exclusive distributorship arrangement because the conduct alleged was
manifestly anticompetitive and no procompetitive rationale appeared on
the face of the complaint .... That is not the case here ...

Id. at 244-45 (citations omitted).
"7NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 493, 498 (1998).
58 Id.

59 Id.
60

Id. at 495.
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between two firms in a vertical relationship could be characterized as a "horizontal restraint" if it sought to disadvantage a
competitor of one of the parties to the agreement and had no
purpose except to stifle competition.6 ' More significantly, the
Court held that it was error for the Second Circuit to hold that
such a restraint might fall within the per se rule applicable to
group boycotts if it had "no purpose except stifling competition."62 To apply the per se rule in circumstances "where the
buyer's decision, though not made for competitive reasons,
composes part of a regulatory fraud" would, according to the
Court, "transform... cases involving nepotism or personal
pique, into treble-damages antitrust cases."63
Quoting from its 1988 opinion in Business Electronics
Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp.,' the Court reiterated the

rule that a vertical restraint is not per se illegal "unless it
includes some agreement on price or price levels." 5 As for the
Second Circuit's suggestion that the restraint at issue was
horizontal in nature, the Supreme Court had previously explained in Business Electronics that "a restraint is horizontal
not because it has horizontal effects, but because it is the product of a horizontal agreement."66

In Discon, the Supreme

Court put it somewhat differently, explaining that Klor's, Inc.
v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.," the decision on which the
Second Circuit had relied, "was a case involving not simply a 'vertical! agreement between supplier and customer,
but a case that also involved a 'horizontal' agreement
among competitors."68
In sum, as far as the Supreme Court was concerned, the
agreement alleged in the Discon case was vertical and did not
include an agreement on price or price levels; therefore, the

'3

Id.

at 496.

62 Discon,

119 S. Ct. at 496 (quoting Discon I, 93 F.3d 1055, 1061 (2d Cir.

1996)).
'3 Id. at 495.
485 U.S. 717 (1988).
Discon, 119 S. Ct. at 498 (quoting Business Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. at 735-36).
66 Business Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. at 730 n.4.
67 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
"3Discon, 119 S. Ct. at 498 (citing Business Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. at 734).
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per se rule should not apply.6 9 Accordingly, the Supreme
Court vacated the Second Circuit's judgment and remanded
the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion."°
On remand, the Second Circuit first considered whether it
was compelled by the Supreme Court's ruling to dismiss
Discon's complaint outright or whether the Supreme Court's
opinion left open the possibility that the complaint had stated
a claim under the rule of reason. 1 The court concluded that
the proper course was to remand the case to the district court
for further proceedings, emphasizing the Supreme Court's requirement that Discon "must allege and prove harm... to the
competitive process itself."72 In giving Discon an opportunity to amend its complaint in light of the Supreme Court's
opinion, the Second Circuit also recognized that it "may well be
difficult for Discon to resist a motion by NYNEX for summary
judgment on the issue of lack of an adequate showing of injury
to competition." 3

See Discon, 119 S. Ct. at 494-95.
Although the NYNEX parties specifically asked the Court to order dismissal
of Discon's complaint, the Court declined to do so, stating that the argument for
dismissal was "outside the questions presented for certiorari." Id. at 500.
71 See Discon II, 184 F.3d 111, 112-13 (2d Cir. 1999). The appellate court explained that:
There are arguments for both outcomes. The main argument for dismissing the complaint is that it is hard to believe that the Supreme Court
would have granted certiorari and wrote an opinion just to reject a
phrase in a court of appeals opinion that was said to be only a possibility and was explicitly stated, in a footnote to the sentence using that
phrase, not to have been the basis for any ruling. The force of that argument is blunted, however, by the fact that the Court's opinion notes the
disagreement among the Circuits as to the availability of the per se rule
in circumstances where one entity is terminated (as buyer or seller) at
the behest of the excluded entity's competitor. The Court was evidently
more concerned with what other courts had done than with what our
Court had suggested was only a possibility ....
Id. at 113. The Discon II court further stated, however, that "the Court's opinion
states several times that the only issue the Court is deciding is whether the cirThe Court did not
cumstances alleged could constitute a per se violation ....
state or imply that the challenged agreement could not be shown to be unlawful
under the rule of reason." Id. (emphasis added).
72 Id. at 114.
'3 Id. Indeed, as this Article went to press, Judge Arcara of the Western District of New York had just issued an opinion granting summary judgment to the
defendants on, inter alia, the grounds suggested by the Second Circuit. See
Discon, Inc. v. NYNEX Corp., No. 90-CV-546A, slip op. at 11-27 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 2,
2000).
70
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Ultimately, Discon is significant for reaffirming that in a
vertical case the plaintiff must prove market impact, i.e., injury to competition (not just to the plaintiff) in the relevant market. In contrast, in a horizontal case involving agreements
among direct competitors, injury to competition may in some
instances be presumed under the per se rule.
2. The CDC Technologies Case: A Further Demonstration
of the Critical Importance of Proving Market Impact in
§ 1 Cases
In contrast to its brief foray outside the antitrust mainstream in the Discon case, the Second Circuit stayed well within it in CDC Technologies, Inc. v. IDEXX Laboratories,Inc.74
In that case, the court of appeals made it clear that exclusive
dealing arrangements-agreements pursuant to which a supplier requires its dealer to purchase goods solely from that supplier-will not be deemed illegal under § 1 of the Sherman Act in
the absence of proof that competing suppliers are actually
foreclosed from competition as the result of the challenged
supplier-dealer agreement.7"
What made CDC Technologies slightly unusual was the
ease with which the defendant supplier was able to escape
antitrust liability, despite having a roughly 80% market share
and having "sewn up" about 50% of the distributor market in
exclusive agreements.7 6 Nonetheless, the Second Circuit found
that the plaintiff failed to establish "'an actual adverse effect
on competition as a whole in the relevant market,'"7 7 citing
undisputed evidence that despite the defendant's exclusive
dealing policy, the plaintiff had "successfully reached customers by a variety of marketing techniques," had gained nearnationwide distribution coverage, and had increased its market
share.78 Nor did the defendant's apparently dominant market

u 186 F.3d 74 (2d Cir. 1999).
7' In a separate ruling, the Second Circuit held that the defendant's exclusive
dealing agreements were not within the purview of § 3 of the Clayton Act because
none of the distributors was an actual "purchaser" who acquired title, as § 3 requires. See id. at 78.
76

Id. at 77.

7
78

Id. at 80 (citations omitted).

Id.
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share, which the court found could serve as a "proxy" or proof
of market power,7 9 make a difference. To the contrary, the
court held that the plaintiffs Sherman Act § 1 claim could not
withstand summary judgment, despite defendant's market
share, due to the complete absence of evidence of "'other
grounds to believe that the defendant's behavior will harm
competition market-wide.'"0
One aspect of the CDC Technologies opinion which may
cause unintended confusion is the suggestion that, in the Second Circuit, exclusive dealing arrangemements are "presumptively legal.""' A close reading indicates, however, that the
court made this statement in connection with "exclusive
distributorships," which were actually not at issue in the
case.82 An exclusive dealing arrangement, in which a distributor agrees to refrain from dealing in the goods of a supplier's
competitors," is distinct from an exclusive distributorship,
which "typically provides a distributor with the right to be the
sole outlet for a manufacturer's products or services in a given
geographic area. " ' 4 Such exclusive distributorships, while not
per se lawful under the Sherman Act,85 are viewed rather leniently by courts, under the general antitrust principle, echoed
by the Supreme Court in Discon, that a manufacturer can
lawfully replace one distributor with another, and therefore, a
6
fortiori, can anoint a single distributor as its only one.
In contrast to exclusive distributorships, it would be an
overstatement to say that exclusive dealing arrangements are
"presumptively legal." True, the potential benefits to
interbrand competition of such arrangements have long been
recognized, 7 and there is probably a "safe harbor" for an ex"

CDC Techs., 186 F.3d at 81.
(emphasis added) (citations omitted).
at 80 (quoting Electronic Communications Corp. v. Toshiba Am. Consum-

80 Id.
81 Id.

er Prods., Inc., 129 F.3d 240, 245 (2d Cir. 1997)).
82 See id. at 80.
83 See ABA SEC. OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 148 n.816
(4th ed. 1997) [hereinafter ABA ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS].
84

Id.

" See George Haug Co. v. Rolls Royce Co., 148 F.3d 136, 140 n.1 (2d Cir.
1998).
86 See ABA ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 83, at 149 & nn.819-20
(citing cases).
87 See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306-07 (1949). See
generally Richard M. Steuer, Exclusive Dealing in Distribution, 69 CORNELL L.
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clusive dealing agreement which forecloses supplies from up to
20% and perhaps as high as 30% of the relevant market.88
Nonetheless, there are also cases that have found exclusive
dealing arrangements unlawful under § 1 when imposed by a
firm with a market share of over 50%, or an even lower market
share where the agreements were of an unreasonably long
duration. 9 It is also worth noting that exclusive dealing contracts may, in appropriate cases (and regardless of whether the
agreements would have been deemed illegal standing alone),
be viewed as part of broader scheme of monopolization or attempted monopolization actionable under § 2.'
In any event, while CDC Technologies uses loose language
that arguably overstates the degree of leniency with which
antitrust courts will treat exclusive dealing agreements, the
opinion falls solidly within the antitrust mainstream in
its refusal to declare a vertical non-price agreement unlawful in the absence of actual anticompetitive impact in the
relevant market.9

II. THE SECOND CIRCUIT CLARIFIES THE TASK OF DETERMINING
WHETHER THE DEFENDANT HAS ACTUAL OR NEARMONOPOLY POWER IN A SHERMAN ACT § 2 CASE

A. The Tops Markets Opinion: The Second CircuitRefines the
Concept of Monopoly Power
In the recent Tops Markets opinion discussed in Part I of
this Article, the Second Circuit set forth the basic require-

REV. 101, 124 (1983).
See ABA ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 83, at 223 & nn.1240-42
(citing cases establishing a "virtual safe harbor for market foreclosure of 20% or
less," and the concurring opinion of four Justices in Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984), as authority for the proposition that an
exclusive dealing arrangement that forecloses 30% of the market is lawful).
"o See United States v. Dairymen, Inc., 758 F.2d 654 (6th Cir. 1985); Twin City
Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles 0. Finley & Co., 676 F.2d 1291 (9th Cir. 1982) (24%
of market foreclosed for 10 years).
so See, e.g., Pepsico, Inc. v. The Coca-Cola Co., No. 98 Civ. 3282, 1998 WL
547088, at *17-*18 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 1998).
" See, e.g., Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 488 U.S. 717, 724
(1988) ("[Eispecially in the vertical restraint context, 'departure from the rule-ofreason standard must be based on demonstrable economic effect.'") (citation omit-

ted).
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ments for proof of claims of actual and attempted monopolization under the Sherman Act and elucidated those requirements in a manner that stressed the importance of assessing
whether the defendant has actual or near-monopoly power,
i.e., the power to impact the market by raising prices or
excluding competition. 2
Regarding the elements of a § 2 claim of "completed monopolization," the court restated the well-settled standard that:
"[a] plaintiff must produce evidence sufficient to prove the
defendant: (1) possessed monopoly power in the relevant mar93
ket; and (2) willfully acquired or maintained that power."
Thus, in a monopolization case, the initial inquiry is focused
not on whether the defendant acted "willfully" in acquiring or
maintaining monopoly power (a type of behavior often described as "anticompetitive" or "predatory" conduct), but on
whether the defendant actually possesses monopoly power.
Absent proof of monopoly power, it is legally irrelevant for
purposes of § 2 whether the defendant's conduct was
anticompetitive.
Typically, monopoly power is proved through evidence that
4
the defendant has a large percentage of the relevant market.
As the Supreme Court explained more than 25 years ago:
"[without a definition of th[e] [relevant] market there is no
way to measure [the defendant's] ability to lessen or destroy
competition."9 5 Since then, the Second Circuit and other federal courts of appeals have recognized that in some cases, where
there is direct evidence that the defendant has actually controlled prices or excluded competition-that is, where there is
proof of actual anticompetitive market impact-additional proof
of the relevant market and the defendant's dominance therein
may not be essential.9 6

' Monopoly power has been classically defined as "the power to control market
prices or exclude competition." United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 351 U.S.
377, 391 (1956).
" Tops Mkts., Inc. v. Quality Mkts., Inc., 142 F.3d 90, 97 (2d Cir. 1998) (citations omitted).
"

See id.

Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172,
177 (1965). The relevant market consists of the relevant product market as well as
the relevant geographic market. See ABA ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS, supra note
83, at 233.
"' See Tops Mkts., 142 F.3d at 97 (stating that monopoly power "may be prov-
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In Tops Markets, the relevant market inquiry was simplified by the fact that the parties stipulated that the relevant
market consisted of the retail sale by supermarkets of predominantly food items (the product market) within a seven to ten
mile area in Jamestown, New York and its environs (the geographic market)2 As to whether the defendant had monopoly
power in that market, the Second Circuit acknowledged that
the defendant's 72% market share was a "highly relevant"
factor,9" which under the Second Circuit's own precedent,
would usually constitute "strong evidence" of monopoly power." Nonetheless, the court noted, an inference of monopoly
power based on high market share should only be drawn "after
full consideration of the relationship between market share
and other relevant market characteristics.""' "These characteristics," the court explained, "include the 'strength of the
competition, the probable development of the industry, the
barriers to entry, the nature of the anticompetitive conduct,
and the elasticity of consumer demand.' 1"

en directly by evidence of the control of prices or the exclusion of competition");
see also Re/Max Int'l, Inc. v. Realty One, Inc., 173 F.3d 995, 1018 (6th Cir. 1999)
(citing cases in other circuits), petition for cert. filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3138 (U.S. Aug.
17, 1999) (No. 99-294). Dispensing with the need to prove the relevant market
probably makes the most sense in cases where the plaintiff alleges monopoly power in a specific geographic region (as in Re/Max), or a specific channel of distribution, and additionally offers proof of actual control over price or exclusion of competition. On the other hand, where there is a threshold issue as to whether the
relevant market should be limited to a particular product or geographic area (as
in AD/SAT u. Associated Press, 181 F.3d 216 (2d Cir. 1999), discussed infra), the
court should remain wary of purported proof of market power that is unhinged
from proof of the relevant market, and indeed is meaningful only if it is assumed
that additional substitute products or geographic locations are not relevant. Cf
United States Football League v. National Football League, 842 F.2d 1335, 1362
(2d Cir. 1988) (requiring "unambiguous evidence" of monopoly power in the alleged
relevant product submarket in the absence of market share data).
See Tops Mkts., 142 F.3d at 93-94.
"
Id. at 98 (citing, inter alia, United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563,
571 (1966)) ("The existence of [monopoly] power may be inferred from the predominant share of the market.").
" Id. at 99 (citing Broadway Delivery Corp. v. United Parcel Serv., 651 F.2d
122, 129 (2d Cir. 1981)) (stating the general though not ironclad standard that "a
market share below 50% is rarely evidence of monopoly power, a share between
50% and 70% can occasionally show monopoly power, and a share above 70% is
usually strong evidence of monopoly power").
® Id. at 98.
101 Id.
(quoting International Distribution Ctrs., Inc. v. Walsh Trucking Co., 812
F.2d 786, 792 (2d Cir. 1987)).
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Applying those considerations to the case at bar, the court
concluded that, apart from the defendant's high market share,
all the other evidence in the record indicated the absence,
rather than the presence, of monopoly power." 2 In particular,
the effective entry of a recent competitor, who had quickly
attained more than a 25% share of the market, demonstrated
the absence of meaningful barriers to entry."3 The court also
found no evidence that the defendant could exercise monopoly
power by raising prices above their competitive level because,
if it did so, "new competitors could and would enter the market, and by undercutting those prices, quickly erode
[defendant's] market share."" 4 Accordingly, the court found
that it could "draw no reasonable inference other than that
[defendant] lacks monopoly power" and, therefore, affirmed the
district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's monopolization claim
0 5

on summary judgment.

With respect to the attempted monopolization claims, the
court in Tops Markets explained that, to establish such a
claim, the plaintiff must prove: "(1) that the defendant has
engaged in predatory or anticompetitive conduct with (2) a
specific intent to monopolize and (3) a dangerous probability of
achieving monopoly power."' Focusing again on the significance of the defendant's 72% market share, the court held that
despite the "evidence of easy market access," the defendant's
high market share, coupled with evidence that the defendant
engaged in anticompetitive conduct by intentionally interfering
with the plaintiffs efforts to purchase desirable real estate on
which a competing supermarket would have been built, was
enough proof-at the summary judgment stage-to support a
finding that the defendant had a "dangerous probability" of
achieving monopoly power.0 7 Nonetheless, apparently still
dubious about the ultimate merits of the attempted monopolization claim, the court of appeals stated that, on remand the
trial court should instruct the jury "to consider the impact of

"
103

See Tops Mkts., 142 F.3d at 97.
See id. at 99.

104 Id.
105 Id.

" Id. at 99-100 (quoting Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456
(1993)).
107 Tops Mkts., 142 F.3d at 100-01.
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other market characteristics, particularly the barriers to entry,
on [defendant's] high market share to determine whether a
dangerous probability, in fact, existed" and that the jury could
in that regard "properly consider [defendant's] subsequent
decline in market share attributable to the entry and growth of
a competitor."'0 8
The court's ruling in Tops Markets on the attempted monopolization claim is the latest contribution to Second Circuit
precedent dealing with the significance of market share in a
§ 2 attempted monopolization case. Previously, the Second
Circuit had stated that a market share below 50% would preclude the finding of a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power absent "significant evidence concerning the market structure to show that the defendant's share ... gives it
monopoly power.""0 9 Where the defendant's market share is
approximately 50%, the dispositive factor will probably be
market structure, specifically the absence or presence of barriers to entry."' Where, however, the market share is 72% or
higher, as in Tops Markets, it appears that market share, if
coupled with evidence of anticompetitive conduct, will be sufficient to reach the jury in an attempted monopolization case,
regardless of market characteristics. This standard seems at
odds with cases holding that even a 100% market share will
not be enough to prove monopolization if there are no barriers
to entry.' and at odds with the court's own analysis elsewhere in the Tops Markets opinion, which indicates that monopoly power does not exist if the defendant could not raise

1o8 Id.

Broadway Delivery Corp. v. United Parcel Serv., 651 F.2d 122, 129 (2d Cir.
1981); see also Twin Labs., Inc. v. Weider Health & Fitness, 900 F.2d 566, 570
(2d Cir. 1990) (33% insufficient).
110 Compare International Distribution Ctrs. v. Walsh Trucking Co., 812 F.2d
786, 791-93 (2d Cir. 1987) (vacating jury verdict where defendant had a 48% share
of a market with no barriers to entry), with Kelco Disposal, Inc. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 845 F.2d 404, 408-09 (2d Cir. 1988) (upholding jury verdict where defendant had a 55% share of a market with high barriers to entry).
109

.. See, e.g., United States v. Syaty Enters., 903 F.2d 659, 664-69 (9th Cir.
1990); Fabrication Enters. v. Hygienic Corp., 848 F. Supp. 1156, 1160 (S.D.N.Y.
1994), rev'd on other grounds, 64 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 1995).
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prices above competitive levels without causing entry by
"new competitors [who] could and would enter the market
and, by undercutting those prices, quickly erode Quality's
market share.""'
To be sure, in Tops Markets, the Second Circuit went out
of its way to state that "a lesser degree of market power may
establish an attempted monopolization claim than that necessary to establish a completed monopolization claim" and that
market3
therefore a "lowered quantum of proof' in terms of claim."
attempt
an
of
context
the
analysis should apply in
Still, given the well-settled principle that single-firm conduct
should not be condemned under the antitrust laws absent proof
of actual or near-monopoly power, courts within the Second
Circuit would be well advised to treat the evidence of market
power deemed sufficient to go to the jury in Tops Markets as
4
the least amount of proof that will suffice."
B. The AD/SAT Case:Relevant Market Definition as an
Outcome-DeterminativeIssue
Proper market definition is significant in a § 2 antitrust
case because the market provides the context for assessing the
significance of the defendant's alleged misconduct. Generally
speaking, "the parameters of a market are defined by the
cross-elasticity of demand between the product and its substitutes.""5 If the relevant market is deemed to consist of a single product for which there are no reasonably interchangeable
substitutes, and the defendant has the predominant share of
that market, then the defendant's alleged misconduct must be
analyzed to see whether it is anticompetitive in terms of intent
and effect." 6 On the other hand, if the relevant market is actually broader than the plaintiff has alleged-because, for example, it includes other substitute products-then the antitrust

11

Tops Mkts., 142 F.3d at 99.

113

Id. at 100-01.

See id. at 97 (citing evidence of 72% market share in a properly defined
relevant market, in which barriers to entry are low but there is proof that the
defendant has acted intentionally to exclude competitors from that market).
i' Bogan v. Hodgkins, 166 F.3d 509, 516 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing Brown Shoe Co.
120 S. Ct. 526 (1999).
v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962)), cert. denied,986,
996 (11th Cir. 1993).
1.6 See, e.g., U.S. Anchor Mfg. v. Rule Indus., 7 F.3d
11

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65: 2

significance of defendant's conduct (even conduct which seems
superficially anticompetitive or "bad") may actually be marginal, in which case a court is more likely to dismiss the plaintiff's
claim as legally insufficient."'
The issue of the proper definition of the relevant market is
potentially a question of fact, to be decided by a jury (or a
judge in a bench trial), rather than by the court as a matter of
law." 8 Nevertheless, in appropriate cases, the issue may be
resolved by the court (typically on a motion for summary judgment) by applying established antitrust principles to the evidence in the record."' Thus, for example, the Second Circuit
in Bogan v. Hodgkins, ° affirmed the district court's grant of
partial summary judgment on the plaintiff's Sherman Act
claim because, inter alia,there was no evidentiary support for
the purported submarket which was critical to the claim.' 2 '
The issue of relevant market definition was also determined as a matter of law in the recent case of AD/SAT v.
Associated Press,'22 in which the Second Circuit brought an
apparent end to a five-year dispute between AD/SAT, a pioneer
in the electronic delivery of advertisements to newspapers, and
the Associated Press ("AP"), the venerable cooperative association of more than 1,500 U.S. newspapers, whose practices have
been the subject of antitrust scrutiny for over 50 years."
The litigation started in 1994, when U.S. District Judge
Peter K. Leisure denied AD/SAT's motion for a preliminary
injunction to bar AP and other defendants from initiating or
participating in AdSEND, an electronic system for the delivery
of newspaper advertisements which AP was in the process of
launching. 24 Undeterred by this initial setback, AD/SAT filed

117 See, e.g., U.S. Healthcare v. Healthsource, 986 F.2d 589, 599 (1st Cir.
1993).

See, e.g., Borough of Lansdale v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 692 F.2d 307 (3d
Cir. 1982).
.1.Logically, it would also make sense in an appropriate case for the court to
decide the issue of relevant market on a motion for judgment as a matter of law
after all the evidence has been heard, provided "there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for th[e] [non-moving] party on that
issue." FED. R. Crv. P. 50(a).
120 166 F.3d 509 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 120 S.
Ct. 526 (1999).
118

121

See id. at 516.

'22

181 F.3d 216 (2d Cir. 1999).

n See, e.g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
124 See AD/SAT, 181 F.3d at 224.
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that
an amended complaint later that year in which it alleged
2 5 After exAP had violated §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.
tensive discovery (more than 70 depositions), AP and the other
defendants each moved for summary judgment, and the mo26
tions were granted by the district court.' AD/SAT's appeal
was then briefed to the court of appeals, which issued a detailed and lengthy decision affirming the district court's ruling
in all respects.'
With respect to § 2, AD/SAT alleged that AP had monopoly
power in the wire and photo transmission markets, a point
which AP conceded for purposes of summary judgment,'
perhaps because it anticipated the district court's finding that
AD/SAT did not have "standing" to pursue a § 2 claim for monopolization of markets AD/SAT in which it is neither a cus129 More significantly, AD/SAT
tomer nor competitor of AP.
claimed that AP had violated § 2 in two ways: (1) by attempting to monopolize an alleged relevant market consisting of the
electronic transmission of advertisements to newspapers; and
(2) by leveraging its monopoly power in the wire and photo
transmission markets to gain a competitive advantage in the
market for electronic transmission130 of advertisements, a socalled "monopoly leveraging" claim.
With respect to AD/SAT's claim for attempted monopolization, the Second Circuit affirmed summary dismissal of
AD/SAT's claim because it failed to prove the existence of a
relevant market in which AP had a sufficient market share. As
the court explained, one of the essential elements of an attempted monopolization claim is that the defendant has "a

§ 2 claim for conspiracy to monopnumerous trade associations, puband
AD/SAT
among
conspiracy
a
alleged
olize)
lishers, newspapers and individuals referred to collectively as the "newspaper defendants." Id. at 232. After careful analysis, the court of appeals concluded that
there was insufficient evidence of the alleged antitrust conspiracy to survive summary judgment, and therefore affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the conspiracy
claims. See id. at 232-43.
12 See AD/SAT v. Associated Press, 920 F. Supp. 1287 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), affd,
181 F.3d 216 (2d Cir. 1999).
"2 See id. The § 1 claims (as well as the

12, See AD/SAT, 181 F.3d at 221.
2 See id. at 230-31.

district court's ruling
123 See id. at 225. AD/SAT apparently did not appeal the
on standing.
12' See id. at 224.
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dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power."131 That,
in turn, requires the plaintiff to make a "threshold showing"
that the defendant has a "sufficient market share" to serve as
"the primary indicator of the existence of a dangerous probability of success."3 2 However, in order to conduct a proper analysis of whether a particular market share is "sufficient," the
plaintiff must first establish the relevant market that is the
subject of the attempt to monopolize. 3 '
In AD/SAT, the plaintiff argued that the relevant market
should be limited to the maiket for the electronic delivery of
advertisements, particularly the "rush" three-hour electronic
delivery market, rather than the broader market for delivery of
advertisements by any means.' The district court, however,
found that, as a matter of law, the only relevant market supported by the evidence was the broader market3 5 ; the Second
Circuit specifically affirmed this finding.'36
The court of appeals relied on two well-settled and related
principles: first, "[t]he relevant market for purposes of antitrust litigation is the 'area of effective competition' within
which the defendant operates"'37 ; and second, the relevant
market "is composed of products that have reasonable
interchangeability for the purposes for which they are produced - price, use and qualities considered.'" 3 8 Applying

...Id. at 226 (citing Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447 (1993)).
13 AD/SAT, 181 F.3d at 226 (quoting Twin Labs., Inc. v.
Weider Health &
Fitness, 900 F.2d 566, 570 (2d Cir. 1990)).
1
Id. (citing Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382
U.S. 172 (1965)). Although language in the opinion could be misconstrued to mean
that market definition is a task for the court, a close reading indicates that the
court of appeals was actually assessing whether, in this particular case, there was
"a triable issue of fact regarding the definition of the relevant product market." Id.
at 227. The parties had agreed that the relevant geographic market was the United States. See id.
13 Id.
13 See AD/SAT, 920 F. Supp. at 1296-97.
136See AD/SAT, 181 F.3d at 227.
" Id. at 227 (quoting Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320,
327-28 (1961)).
1
Id. (quoting United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377,
404 (1956)). The court went on to explain that "products and services need not be
identical- to be part of the same market" because "[in economists' terms, two products or services are reasonably interchangeable where there is sufficient cross-elasticity of demand ... [which] exists if consumers would respond to a slight increase in the price of one product by switching to another product." Id.
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these criteria, the court found that the following undisputed
evidence supported a relevant market, which included physical
as well as electronic delivery of advertisements to newspapers:
(1) AD/SAT's complaint acknowledged that newspapers currently use both modes of delivery; and (2) AD/SAT's president
and management consulting firm believed that AD/SAT's competition included physical delivery services, especially overnight delivery services which represent about 80% of all deliveries to newspapers.'3 9
AD/SAT argued that, in light of evidence of "persisting
demand for the higher-priced electronic transmission service,
despite the availability of lower-priced alternatives," there was
at least a triable issue of fact that a separate, relevant market
existed for rush electronic delivery. 4 The Second Circuit,
however, found that the rush delivery market was such a narrow segment of the newspaper advertising delivery market
that it was too "insubstantial" to constitute a relevant market
for antitrust purposes.' 4 In that regard, the court also cited
evidence that AD/SAT's marketing consultants believed that
"inorder to survive" AD/SAT would have to discard its public
emergency service" and compete in the
image as a "last-resort
42
broader marketplace.
Having found that the relevant product market included
physical as well as electronic delivery of newspaper advertisements, it was obvious to the court that any purported dominance by AP of electronic delivery service through its AdSEND
service was legally irrelevant, because over 80% of advertiseThus,
ment deliveries were still handled by newspapers."
probability"
"dangerous
a
under no circumstances was there
that AP would, through AdSEND, achieve monopoly power in the relevant market, and accordingly AD/SAT's attempted monopolization claim was properly dismissed on
summary judgment.'
Thus, the AD/SAT opinion confirms the often critical
significance of establishing actual or imminent monopolization

'"' See AD/SAT, 181 F.3d at 227-28.

," Id. at 228.
141
142
'4

Id.
Id.
See id.at 229.
AD/SAT, 181 F.3d at 229.
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of the relevant market in cases brought under § 2 of the
Sherman Act. One potential exception is a claim for "monopoly
leveraging," that is, a claim that the defendant has used monopoly power in one market to gain a competitive advantage in
another, even if the defendant does not have monopoly or nearmonopoly power in the second market. In AD/SAT, the Second
Circuit chose not to disavow the dictum from its 1979 Berkey
Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. decision, in which "[tihis
Court first recognized monopoly leveraging as a distinct cause
of action." " 5 At the same time, the court seemed aware of
criticism that the recognition of monopoly leveraging as a distinct § 2 offense is inconsistent with the language of the statute itself, which "'makes the conduct of a single firm unlawful
only when it actually monopolizes or dangerously threatens to
"
do so.' "' 6 Indeed, that same criticism has resulted in a trend

among another federal courts of appeals to reject the theory of
monopoly leveraging where there is no threat of monopolization in the second market. 147
Rather than reject the concept of monopoly leveraging
entirely, the Second Circuit in AD/SAT steered a middle
course, limiting monopoly leveraging claims to cases where
"the plaintiff can demonstrate that the challenged conduct
'threatens the [second] market with the higher prices or reduced output or quality associated with the kind of monopoly
that is ordinarily accompanied by a large market share.'"'4
Applying that standard, the Second Circuit found nothing

14 Id.

at 230 (citing Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263,
276 (2d Cir. 1979)).
1" Id. (quoting Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 459 (1993));
see also Stanley D. Robinson, Recent Antitrust Developments - 1979, 80 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 9 n.61 (1980) (noting that while the offense of monopoly leveraging is
understandable "[als a matter of antitrust policy," it is nonetheless 'difficult to
reconcile such a theory with the language of § 2, which condemns only monopolizing, attempting to monopolize, or conspiring to monopolize any part of commerce
(i.e., a relevant market)").
14 See Aquatherm Indus. v. Florida Power & Light Co., 145
F.3d 1258 (11th
Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1356 (1999); Fineman v. Armstrong World
Indus., 980 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1992); Alaska Airlines v. United Airlines, 948 F.2d
536 (9th Cir. 1991); see also United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. Civ. A. 98-1232,
1998 WL 614485 (D.D.C. Sept. 14, 1998) (refusing to dismiss monopolization and
attempted monopolization claims against Microsoft, but granting Microsoft's motion
for summary judgement on a separate claim of monopoly leveraging).
1
AD/SAT, 181 F.3d at 230 (citation omitted).
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illegal about AP's vigorous promotion of AdSEND, which took
advantage of synergies with the company's overall operation but did not constitute tying, i.e., conditioning the sale of
product or services as to which AP has monopoly power on
14 9
the sale of product or services as to which AP does not.
Accordingly, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's
grant of summary judgment on AD/SAT's monopoly leveraging
claim as well. 5 '
CONCLUSION

The Second Circuit's recent antitrust opinions confirm that
sharp business tactics, even by a company with a dominant
market position, will not constitute an illegal restraint of trade
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act absent proof of an actual
adverse effect on competition. Nor will such conduct constitute
actual or attempted monopolization under Section 2 absent
proof that the defendant possesses actual or near-monopoly
power. Although these principles existed before the cases discussed in this Article were decided, the cases remind us that
certain antitrust truisms have continuing and practical significance, and that the end result of many antitrust litigations
will turn on how those truisms are advocated by attorneys and
applied by courts.

.. See id. at 231-32.
159 See id. at 221.

